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CASENOTES
CONTROL GROUP TEST FOR
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE REJECTED
Upjohn Co. v. United States1
An internal audit revealed that an overseas subsidiary of Upjohn Com-
pany had made payments to foreign government officials, apparently to assist
in securing business. 2 Upjohn requested its general counsel, Mr. Gerard
Thomas, to investigate. Mr. Thomas directed all foreign general and area
managers to respond to a detailed questionaire concerning the questionable
payments.
The company subsequently informed the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Internal Revenue Service of the payments. 3 The IRS
promptly investigated and issued a summons requesting the "written ques-
tionaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates, and
memoranda or notes of the interviews ... with officers and employees of
the Upjohn Company and its subsidiaries. ' '4 Upjohn, claiming that the
material was protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine,5 refused to comply with the summons.
The IRS successfully sought enforcement of the summons in federal
district court.6 On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit sustained the summons, holding that the attorney-client privilege
1. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
2. Id. at 386. The payments totaled approximately $4,000,000 to officials
of "many of the 136 foreign countries in which Upjohn does business." United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
3. Upjohn prepared a preliminary report for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Form 8-K, disclosing information on a limited number of the
payments. A copy of the report was provided to the IRS. 449 U.S. at 387.
4. Id. at 388. The IRS possesses broad statutory power to issue summons
enforceable in federal district courts under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 7602, 7604(a)
(1976).
5. For a further discussion of the court's handling of the work product claim,
see United States v. Upjohn Company: The Sixth Circuit Adopts the Control Group Test,
9 CAP. U.L. REV. 809, 815 n.41 (1980).
6. United States v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 84,152 (W.D.
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did not apply "[t]o the extent that the communications were made by of-
ficers and agents not responsible for directing Upjohn's action in response
to legal advice... for the simple reason that the communications were not
the 'client's.' "7 In a well-reasoned opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist,8
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the court of appeals, holding
that the "control group" test was unduly restrictive and frustrated the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege. 9
Upjohn has further defined the scope of the attorney-client privilege with
a corporate client. Although the existence of the privilege in this setting had
been established, 10 distinguishing privileged from nonprivileged communica-
tions was difficult. To claim the privilege, the client must have communicated
with the attorney. It was necessary, therefore, to determine which agents
Mich. Apr. 29, 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd,
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
7. 600 F.2d at 1225.
8. Although agreeing with the reasoning and result of the majority, Chief
Justice Burger urged that the Court adopt a general rule to govern the application
of the privilege to corporations, instead of the case-by-case approach favored in the
majority opinion. 449 U.S. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
9. Id. at 392. The Upjohn opinion failed to discuss the important issue of
whether Upjohn waived the attorney-client privilege by selective disclosure to the
SEC and the IRS of data on the questionable payments. The district court held
that the disclosure to the SEC and the IRS was a complete waiver of the privilege
with respect to all other communications concerning the payments. United States
v. Upjohn Co., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 83,597, 83,603 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 23,
1978) (Report and Recommendation of Magistrate), adopted by court, 78-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 84,152 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the district
court's holding of waiver, finding instead that Upjohn's disclosures amounted to
a waiver "only with respect to the facts actually disclosed." 600 F.2d at 1227 n.12
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court mentioned the rulings of the lower courts,
but did not analyze them. See 449 U.S. at 388.
The general rule is that a partial disclosure of privileged material is a waiver
of the privilege to all communications concerning the same subject matter. Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-63 (D.S.C. 1974); 8J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 636-38 (rev. ed. 1961). The reasoningbehind the
rule is that it would be unfair to allow a party to reveal only privileged material
that favored the party's position while shielding any damaging material. Id. For
a general discussion of the waiver issue, see Comment, Corporate Self-Investigation
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 803, 808-10 (1980); The
Attorney-Client Privilege, the Self-Evaluative Report Privilege, and Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith, 40 OHIO ST. L. J. 699, 714-21 (1979).
10. United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). See
Simon, TheAttorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE LJ. 953, 953-54
(1956), Weissenberger, Toward Precision in theApplication oftheAttorney-Client Privilege
for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 906-07 (1980).
2
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of the corporation spoke for it. This determination, however, was fraught
with problems."
Initially, the courts assumed that the privilege covered all corporate
employees, officers, and directors. 12 Reconsideration of this broad approach,
in light of the modern emphasis on full discovery, led to a more limited ap-
plication of the privilege.13 Often called the "control group" test, this ap-
proach was first adopted in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.14 The
Westinghouse court held that the privilege applies if "the employee making
the communication.., is in a position to control or even to take a substan-
tial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon
the advice of the attorney... . ,15 In other words, the corporate client com-
municates only through its control group; only their communications to
counsel are privileged. 16
11. See, e.g., Nattav. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968). See generally
Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 362 (1972).
Wigmore's classic statement of the attorney-client privilege lists the necessary
elements for applying the privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communication relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292, at 554 (emphasis added).
The Court did not directly address the issue of whether the communications
were made by the client. Statements by the Court that the communications were
made "by Upjohn employees ... at the direction of corporate superiors . .,
449 U.S. at 394, and "in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice,"
id., however, suggest that the corporation was speaking as a client when it com-
municated to its attorney through its employees.
12. The most frequently cited case for this proposition is United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See also Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954).
13. The turning point came in 1962 with Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
A federal district court held the attorney-client privilege inapplicable to corpora-
tions. Although the decision was promptly reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the district court's opinion prompted a more
thoughtful analysis of the special problems presented when the privilege is claimed
by a corporation. See generally Kobak, supra note 11, at 362.
14. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
15. Id. at 485.
16. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1979). See
also Note, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REV. 424, 430 (1970).
[Vol. 47
3
Schlosser: Schlosser: Control Group Test for Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
RECENT CASES
The control group test was unchallenged until the 1970 decision, Harper
&Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.17 This case established the "subject mat-
ter" test, the second major approach to the corporate privilege., Under this
test, communications by employees outside the control group may be pro-
tected if they are made at the direction of the employee's superiors, and the
subject matter of the communication relates to the performance of the
employee's job. 19 The majority of courts considering the questions have
adopted the control group test.20
The Upjohn Court, in analyzing the appropriateness of the control group
test, adopted the major criticisms of that test expressed by other courts and
commentators. 21 The Court began by stressing the underlying purpose of
the attorney-client privilege:
17. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), affdpercuriam by an equally divided
Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
18. The debate between the two alternatives reflects basic policy differences
held by the proponents of each test. Proponents of the control group test favor full
and complete discovery of all the relevant evidence over competing concerns. In
contrast, the proponents of the subject matter test favor complete disclosure of all
the relevant facts by the client to the attorney. See 9 CAP. U.L. REV., supra note
5, at 825.
19. The Harper & Row court articulated the subject matter test as follows:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group,
is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication
to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the
communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and
where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by
the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance
by the employee of the duties of his employment.
423 F.2d at 491-92.
20. Representative of cases that have adopted the control group test are In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States
v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981);
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); In re GrandJury Subpoena,
81 F.R.D. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979);
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-36 (D. Md. 1974); City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
For commentators' support of the subject matter test, see, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04] (1980); Weinschel, Corporate
Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
873 (1971).
21. For articles that criticize the control group test, see, e.g., Burnham, Con-
fidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in
Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542 (1968); Comment, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Federal Courts, 22 CATH. LAW. 138 (1976); The Privileged Few: United States v.
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Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public in-
terests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public
ends and that such advice.., depends upon the lawyer being fully
informed by the client.2
The Court concluded that the "control group test ... frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant in-
formation by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal ad-
vice to the client corporation." 23
The restricted flow of information to corporate counsel leads to problems.
In the modern corporate setting, the members of the control group rarely
will possess all the information counsel requires to formulate legal advice
properly. 24 Much of the necessary information is known only by middle and
lower level employees.2 5 These employees are excluded from the protection
of the privilege by the control group test. That test, therefore, discourages
full disclosure because attorneys realize that any communications between
these employees and the attorney would be subject to discovery.
Another criticism the Court directed at the control group test was that
the restricted flow of information to the attorney "threatens to limit the
valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with
the law.' '26 The argument is that management will be less likely to have
counsel conduct internal investigations to determine compliance with the
law if the information given to the attorney would be subject to discovery. 27
The Court aimed its final criticism at the unpredictability of control
group membership. 28 If counsel were unsure whether an employee was a
member of the control group, full disclosure would suffer. Counsel would
22. 449 U.S. at 389. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
23. 449 U.S. at 392.
24. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65
(D.S.C. 1974).
25. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385-86 (D.D.C.
1978).
26. 449 U.S. at 392.
27. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)
("[T]he [control group] test may result in discouraging communications to lawyers
made in a good faith effort to promote compliance with the complex laws govern-
ing corporate activity."). The value to federal enforcement agencies of corporate
self-policing and disclosure is discussed in Comment, VoluntaryDisclosure Programs,
47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1057, 1063-68 (1979).
28. 449 U.S. at 393. See Note, Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Cor-
porate Communications, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 822 (1979).
[Vol. 47
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be hesitant to interview employees in the questionable zone for fear that the
courts would not apply the privilege.2 9
Despite an express rejection of the control group test, the Court refused
to adopt an alternative standard. Instead, the Court chose a case-by-case
approach to the problem because any other approach would "violate the
spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501.' 3 Under this flexible approach, a
court can examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the commun-
ication instead of relying exclusively on rigid criteria.3 1
Although not expressly adopting the subject matter test, the Court took
a similar approach. 32 It responded to the criticism that the subject matter
test would unduly burden discovery:3 3 "Application of the attorney-client
privilege to communications such as those involved here.., puts the adver-
sary in no worse position than if the commmunications had never taken
place.' 34 Stressing that only communications and not facts are protected, 35
the Court noted that "the Government was free to question the employees
who communicated with Thomas and outside counsel.' '36 Discovery of the
underlying facts may be more difficult than discovering the completed results
of an internal investigation, but the opportunity for discovery of all the rele-
vant facts does exist. In balancing the easing of discovery burdens against
the value of the privilege, the Court concluded that "such considerations
29. To buttress this final criticism, the court pointed to two irreconcilable cases.
The first held that managers and assistant managers of a patent division were within
the control group. Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd
in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968). The second held
that a vice-president for production and research and two directors of research were
not members of the control group. Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49
F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd mem., 478 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1973).
Ironically, one of the strengths of the control group test was thought to be the cer-
tainty with which it could be applied. Note, supra note 16, at 430.
30. 449 U.S. at 396. FED. R. EvID. 501 directs that "the privilege ofa witness
... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts. . . in the light of reason and experience."
31. For a similar approach, see Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35,
40 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
32. 449 U.S. at 391-92, 394-95. See also In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,
81 F.R :D. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978); 9 CAP. U.L. REV., supra note 5, at 821.
33. Illustrative of such criticism is Gardner, A Personal Privilegefor Communica-
tions of Corporate Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299,344(1963).
34. 449 U.S. at 395.
35. Id. at 395-96. See also City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962); J. WEINSTEIN &M. BERGER, supra note
20, 503(b)[03], at 503-37; 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2326, at 633.
36. 449 U.S. at 396.
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